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COMMENTS
CITY ON THE BRINK: THE CITY OF
CLEVELAND SUES WALL STREET FOR
PUBLIC NUISANCE*
This Comment examines the City of Cleveland's lawsuit (as
plaintiff, "City") against more than twenty major investment firms for
violations of Ohio common law public nuisance.' Racked by the
collapse of the housing and subprime mortgage markets, the City's
lawsuit represents a new way in which municipalities are attempting
to vindicate their rights against the businesses and corporations
operating within their borders. In its complaint, the City claims that
Wall Street's irresponsible securitization of subprime mortgages led
to a continuing rash of foreclosures in Cleveland, necessitating
greater expenditures on police and fire protection while costing the
City significant tax revenues. For Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson,
the lawsuit is more than merely a symbolic gesture against the
financial elite. The mayor hoped the lawsuit would hold Wall Street
"'accountable for what they've done.' 'We're going after them to get
the resources to build our city. 3
Part I of this Comment introduces the history of the subprime
mortgage market and describes the resultant rise and collapse of the
The facts cited in this Comment are current as of August 30, 2008.
See Complaint at 1, 9, City of Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 571 F. Supp.
2d 807 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (No. 1:08 cv 0139), 2008 WL 200271.
2 The City of Baltimore has also brought suit against Wells Fargo Bank regarding its
activities in the subprime mortgage market. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Damages at 1, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
1:08-CV-00062 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2008), 2008 WL 117894.
3 Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders over Subprime Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2008, at A9.
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market. Part II illuminates how Cleveland became particularly
susceptible to the worst aspects of the subprime market and explains
why defaults and foreclosures on subprime mortgages have ravaged
the city. Part III unpacks the City's complaint, introducing the legal
issues and claims raised therein. It then addresses the significant
procedural barriers threatening to derail the lawsuit before it ever
reaches the merits. Specifically, the City may be unable to show that
it has standing to sue the Wall Street defendants or, if the City can
leap that initial hurdle, that the defendants were the proximate cause
of the City's injuries. Finally, this Comment briefly concludes by
addressing how Cleveland might better protect its population from the
decimating foreclosures that have thus far gutted the city.
I. HISTORY OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET
Over the course of several decades, the subprime mortgage market
developed into a new means for Americans previously excluded from
the prime mortgage market--due to limited financial means and, at
times, racial and socioeconomic discrimination-to become
homeowners and realize the increased wealth that homeownership
offers. Prior to the evolution of the subprime market, individuals and
families that could neither afford nor qualify for a prime mortgage,
characterized by a 20 percent down payment and fixed thirty-year 6
percent rate, rarely became homeowners. Recognizing that many
Americans could not enjoy the quintessential "dream" of
homeownership, Congress took several steps to encourage banks,
thrifts, and other mortgage lenders to utilize wider and varied lending
practices.
A. Congress Encourages Broader Lending Practices
In 1980, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulatory
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("Monetary Control Act"), which
eliminated state usury laws on first-lien mortgages.5 Before the
Monetary Control Act, usury laws-which varied from state to
state-forbade the offering of mortgages above certain rates and
placed a limit on the types and quality of mortgages that banks and
4 EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND
BUST 1 (2007).
5 Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15
U.S.C.). The Monetary Control Act "provide[s] for the gradual elimination of all limitations on
the rates of interest which are payable on deposits and accounts, and to authorize interest-
bearing transaction accounts, and for other purposes." Id. at 132.
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thrifts could offer.6 Once enacted, the Monetary Control Act freed
lenders from the strict parameters set by usury laws and permitted
experimentation with lending rates for borrowers who may have been
unable to qualify for a mortgage under the former system. As
discussed in detail below, this paradigm of experimentation was
permissive enough to relax limitations on lending to the point that
unscrupulous lenders could entice lenders with considerable (and
considerably-burdened) lines of credit.
Not long thereafter, the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")
was passed to encourage banks and thrifts to lend to a broader
cross-section of their communities by providing credit and mortgage
opportunities to historically-underserved and disenfranchised
neighborhoods.7 The CRA recognized that financial institutions had a
"continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs
of the local communities in which they are chartered.",8 To ensure that
lending institutions were not improperly withholding funds, the CRA
authorized federal financial supervisory agencies such as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") to review the lending
practices of banks and other financial entities for compliance. 9
B. Mortgage Lenders Respond with New Products and Creative
Gimmicks
Faced with these new lending obligations, mortgage lenders began
to create new mortgage schemes to entice low- and middle-income
homebuyers-the most common of which was the subprime
mortgage. A subprime mortgage is, as the name suggests, a mortgage
offered below prime mortgage rates to a borrower who may not
qualify for a prime mortgage loan.' As a way to compensate for the
increased risk of default and foreclosure that such potential borrowers
often present, lenders quantify the risk in terms of higher interest rates
and fees. Oftentimes, the percentage rates on subprime loans are "4 to
6 See GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 4.
7 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
8 Id. § 2901.
9 Id. Some commentators have directly accused the federal government of creating the
subprime mortgage crisis through initiatives such as the CRA and the Monetary Control
Act. See generally Stan Liebowitz, The Real Scandal: How Feds Invited the Mortgage Mess,
N.Y. POST, Feb. 5, 2008, at 33 available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/02052008/
postopinion/opedcolumnists/the real scandal_243911 .htm?page=0. But others disagree, noting
that mortgages made pursuant to CRA initiatives charge low mortgage rates and thus enjoy
lower default rates. See, e.g., GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 5.
10 See In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Subprime
lending ... generally consists of borrowers who, for a variety of reasons, might otherwise be
denied credit.... Subprime lenders generally charge somewhat higher interest rates to account
for the increased risk associated with these loans.").
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6 percentage points above the APR on prime mortgages."' 1 The
availability of such loan options marked the end of the supremacy of
the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages. A new age of experimentation
had begun.
Initially, the development of the subprime market had both
positive and negative effects. On one hand, mortgage credit became
available to individuals who never qualified for a thirty-year
fixed-rate mortgage. 12 Along with accessing capital to buy homes,
these borrowers could develop wealth in their homes, "live in better
neighborhoods, and send their kids to better schools."' 13 They had an
opportunity not only for increased wealth and security, but could
secure better futures for their children.
But for many families, the risks associated with subprime lending
clearly outweighed the benefits. Consumer debt, little savings, and
other expenses made these homeowners particularly vulnerable to
default if the slightest shock or setback in their finances occurred.
14
Moreover, external factors such as predatory lenders, 15 unscrupulous
mortgage brokers (discussed in detail below), and opaque mortgage
terms all contributed to make subprime mortgages especially
dangerous products.
Even today, many of these dangers reside in the terms of the
subprime mortgages, hidden in contractual language that may not be
disclosed to the consumer. Along with the increased interest rates,
lenders may gimmick the terms of the mortgage, abandoning the
predictability of the thirty-year fixed-rate scheme common to prime
mortgages. Subprime mortgages may be fixed at low "teaser" rates
for two to three years and then increased to significantly-higher rates
I GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 17.
12 See id at 9.
13 Id.
14 Id.
Is As other commentators have noted, finding a succinct, sufficient definition of predatory
lending is a difficult task. See Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and
Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 759 (2007) (noting that predatory lending is
difficult to define because "loan attributes may or may not be 'predatory' depending on the
sophistication or financial position of the borrower" and because "the lending market is always
evolving in light of technological, regulatory, and judicial advancements"). Most, however,
agree that subprime mortgages in and of themselves are not inherently predatory; rather, it is the
terms of the mortgage and the circumstances in which the loan is offered that make a loan
predatory. Factors include lender actions of misleading borrowers, hiding loan terms, or
charging unreasonable fees. See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Minorities Pay More for Mortgages,
Studies Find, TRIAL, Vol. 42, No. 9, Sept. 2006, at 77, 78. Another recognized form of predatory
lending is the offering of subprime mortgage loans to those individuals who would qualify for
prime rates. See Anna Beth Ferguson, Note, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack
of Adequate Protection for Ohio Consumers, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000)
("[P]redatory lending occurs when lenders employ unethical and/or illegal tactics to secure the
loans or offer subprime loans to those who qualify for prime loans.").
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for the life of the loan (also known as adjustable-rate mortgages). 6
These "teaser" rates can entice unsophisticated consumers into taking
out a loan by promising low initial payments despite considerable
increases later in the life of the loan. 17 Consequently, many
transactions are tainted with unwise decision-making on the part of
the consumer and downright fraud by the broker or lender.
"Teaser" rates are just one example of the unorthodox lending
practices that have epitomized the subprime market. Subprime
lending practices have developed such that consumers for whom "it
was [once] impossible ... to get credit ... are often swimming in a
sea of possible loan products."' 8 Instead of requiring a down payment
(a fixture of the prime mortgage market), some subprime mortgages
are "interest only," meaning that the mortgage delays the payment of
the loan for several years, thereby attracting consumers unable to pay
any money upfront.19
Similarly, as the variety of mortgage options have increased,
the requirements to secure a mortgage have decreased--often to the
point that anyone can secure a mortgage without meeting any
qualifications. Brokers and lenders might not perform credit checks,
consumers might be freed from producing documentation of assets or
income, and, as mentioned above, consumers might not have to place
a down payment. 20 Freed of any reasonable limitations on lending
practices, brokers and lenders are able to provide immediate lines of
credit to individuals who are in no way qualified or capable of taking
on a home mortgage. And, in some cases, unethical consumers are
able to misrepresent their assets or earning capabilities because no
documentation is required, thereby fraudulently securing loans.21
For example, in a recent case in Cuyahoga County (the county in
which Cleveland is located), one mortgage broker was found guilty of
mortgage fraud for selling a $490,000 home to a consumer who could
not afford it.22 The consumer, in turn, lied on his credit form to secure
16 FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 1
(2007), available at http://www.federaireserve.gov/pubs/arms/armsbrochure.pdf.
17 GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 17.
18 Id. at 18 (citing BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTEREST-
ONLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMs-ARE THEY FOR YOU? (2006)).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Christopher E. Ware & Laura Gramling Perez, Main Street Meets Wall Street: The
Mortgage Meltdown, WIS. LAW., Vol. 80, No. 12, Dec. 2007, at 8, 11 (citing Gretchen
Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, § 3 (Sunday
Business), at 1).
22 Jesse Tinsley, Mortgage Broker Convicted, 2nd Pleads, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Mar. 21, 2008, at B2.
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the home and is now serving an eleven-month prison sentence.23 As
this example shows, many of the shortcomings of the subprime
mortgage market can be traced to the role played by the mortgage
broker.
C. Mortgage Brokers Further Perpetuate Subprime Mortgages
Many of the developments in the subprime mortgage market
would not have occurred with such frequency without the rise of the
mortgage broker-the middleman of the mortgage industry. Unlike
loan officers, who work directly for the mortgage lenders to pursue
interested consumers, mortgage brokers are independent entities that
seek out potential consumers and pair them with a lender for a fee.24
They are normally not involved in either the lending or the collection
of the loan. Rather, once they have matched a consumer with a lender
and received their commission (often subsumed into the consumer's
costs), the relationship ends.
The rise of the mortgage broker as a major player in the housing
industry has paralleled the increase in popularity of subprime lending.
Only approximately 7,000 mortgage broker firms existed in 1987.25
As of 2004, it was estimated that 53,000 mortgage broker firms
operated in the United States.26 Indeed, the National Association of
Mortgage Brokers notes that two out of every three homebuyers in the
United States employ a mortgage broker.27
Like subprime mortgages themselves, mortgage brokers are
important players in the housing market that have proven to be
both effective and, for the vulnerable consumer, quite risky. Filling
the void in communities traditionally ignored or underserved by
banks and conventional lenders, mortgage brokers can operate
face-to-face with individuals in their own communities. As a
result, mortgage brokers can assist a greater number of individuals
in communities---often minority communities--with securing
23 Another Player in Solon Mortgage Fraud Faces Sentencing (90.3 WCPN broadcast
May 5,2008), available at http://www.wcpn.org/index.php/WCPN/news/1 1901/.
24 See generally National Association of Mortgage Brokers, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.namb.org/namb/FAQsl.asp?SnID=956096633 (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
25 GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 19 (citing William C. Apgar & Allen J. Fishbein, Changing
Industrial Organization of Housing Finance and Changing Role of Community-Based
Organizations, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES 107 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005)).
26 Id.
27 National Association of Mortgage Brokers, Tools for Home Buying,
http://www.namb.org/namb/Home BuyersHome.asp?SnID--956096633 (last visited Mar. 4,
2009).
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mortgages.28 When acting in such a capacity, the mortgage broker can
help realize Congress's vision of providing mortgages to a wider
cross-section of American society and positively promote
homeownership.
But evidence suggests that broker-originated loans are more likely
to become delinquent or foreclosed.29 One likely cause of this higher
rate of delinquency is the fact that brokers will proactively seek out
potential homeowners who may or may not be in the housing market,
thereby offering loans to consumers who may not be able to afford
them.30 This practice, known as "reverse redlining," involves
"targeting and aggressively soliciting homeowners in predominantly
lower-income and minority communities who may lack sufficient
access to mainstream sources of credit.",31 Other mortgage brokers
have engaged in outright fraud, either by misrepresenting the terms of
the loan or by encouraging consumers to lie in their applications.32
Others have been purely negligent in locating consumers capable of
paying off the entire mortgage; once the broker originates the
mortgage loan, he has little incentive to ensure the success of the
loan.33
Further complicating matters, the mortgage broker industry is
highly unregulated. Mortgage brokers and mortgage firms, such as
Ameriquest and New Century Mortgage Corporation, are chartered by
states and therefore are free from federal regulation.34 And although
states may determine that some regulation is appropriate, generally
mortgage brokers enjoy significantly less oversight than other entities
in the mortgage market.
D. Wall Street Enters the Fray
The rise of the subprime mortgage market is only half of
Cleveland's unfortunate story; the other involves the securitization of
mortgages and their popularity with investment firms around the
country and around the world. As the City's complaint correctly
points out, the secondary mortgage market has played a significant
28 See GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 20.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 72 (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
32 See Ronni Berke & Greg Hunter, Brokers Who Lie, and More Subprime
Nightmares, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 20, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/19/realestate/
borrowers_cruz/index.htm?postversion=2008032009.
33 See GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 20.
34 Id. at 20-22.
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role in perpetuating the offering of subprime mortgages.35 Wall Street
investment firms, however, were not the first entities to securitize and
market subprime mortgages. Both the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation ("Freddie Mac") began the securitizing of prime
mortgages in the 1970s. 36 These government-sponsored enterprises
were created with the authority to buy mortgages from mortgage
holders and banks, thereby providing increased capital to the
mortgage holders who could then give out a higher number of loans.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, along with the Government National
Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), hold approximately $5 trillion
in total mortgages.37
Wall Street followed suit, albeit at a slower pace. Wall Street
began the securitization of subprime mortgages in the early 1990s.
38
The results were decidedly positive; Wall Street had unearthed "huge
new sources of capital and financing" and had a growing market
for mortgage-backed securities. 39 Because these mortgage-backed
securities were valued and rated similarly to traditional forms of
commercial paper, they became "highly sought after by pension
funds, hedge funds, investment banks, insurers, and municipalities all
over the world. ' 4°
Wall Street then infused much of the money back into the housing
market to encourage more lending, including subprime lending. The
secondary mortgage market allowed lending institutions to provide
more subprime mortgages with money borrowed from Wall Street.4'
Essentially, "the ability to sell subprime mortgages to Wall Street
conditioned lenders and their brokers to ignore default risk" because
the sale of the mortgage and the resultant securitization passed the
risk on to Wall Street.42 This system created an ebb and flow of
money between lenders and Wall Street, allowing lenders to provide
more mortgages at varying rates.
35 Complaint, supra note 1, 11 1-2.
36 GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 5.
37 Id. at 15.
38 Id. at 5.
39 Id.
40 Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 125, 130 (2008). Interestingly, this rating system has drawn scrutiny
independent of the City's lawsuit. The SEC is investigating investment banks to determine
whether they improperly valued mortgage-backed securities when selling to investors. Id at 136
(citing Susan Pulliam & Kara Scannell, Pricing Probes on Wall Street Gather Steam, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 21, 2007, at C1).
41 Vikas Bajaj & Eric Dash, Big Changes and Big Loan for Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2007, at C1.
42 Ware & Perez, supra note 21, at 10.
1406 [Vol. 58:4
CITY ON THE BRINK
E. The Subprime Mortgage Market Balloons and Bursts
Business boomed. Between 1994 and 2005, subprime mortgage
originations increased by $590 billion dollars, with subprime
mortgage originations comprising 20 percent of all originations in
2005.43 The Census Bureau estimated that the rate of home ownership
in the United States increased from 64 percent in 1994 to 69.2 percent
in 2004-an all-time high.44 While over two-thirds of Americans
owned a home, their homeownership stood on precarious ground.
Perhaps nothing demonstrates the precariousness of the subprime
mortgage market more than the present foreclosure crisis, portending
the burst of the housing bubble. Foreclosure filings in 2007 increased
75 percent from 2006. 45 By the end of 2007, some experts suggested
that the subprime defaults would total approximately $200-300
billion dollars.46 And the trend continued into 2008. According to a
recent study by RealtyTrac, a foreclosure-tracking organization,
approximately 650,000 foreclosures were filed in the first quarter of
2008, an increase of 112 percent over those filed in 2007. 47 As of
April 29, 2008, 156,463 families had lost their homes to foreclosure
and repossession.
48
No market has been hit harder by foreclosures than the subprime
market. While approximately 5 percent of prime mortgages may go
delinquent, incurring the risk of foreclosures, almost 15 percent of
subprime mortgages are expected to go delinquent. 49 Numerous
factors have combined to contribute to the extraordinarily high rate of
subprime foreclosures. First, a rise in interest rates increased the
amounts paid by individuals with subprime mortgages, creating the
risk of foreclosures.50 Second, along with the increased interest rates,
house prices have steadily declined. During the last three months of
2007, the national median price of homes dropped 5.8 percent, the
43 GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 6. The prime mortgage market swelled right alongside the
subprime market, boosted by a stable economy and lower long-term and short-term interest
rates. Id.
44 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census Bureau Reports
on Residential Vacancies and Homeownership 4 (Oct. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr307/q3O7press.pdf.
45 Homeowners Eye More Foreclosures, CNN.COM, Apr. 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/LIVING/personal/04/01 /map.foreclosures/index.html.
46 The Credit Crunch: Postcards from the Ledge, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2007, at 9.
47 Les Christie, Foreclosures Spike 112% - No End in Sight, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 29,
2008, http://money.cnn.con/2008/04/29/realestate/foreclosures-still rising/index.htm.
48 Id.
49 America's Property Crisis: The Hammer Drops, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2007, at 31
[hereinafter America's Property Crisis].
50 GRAMLICH, supra note 4, at 7.
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sharpest decline since the recording of prices began.51 For consumers
relying on the improvement of the housing market to boost equity in
their homes, the downturn in the market resulted in lost equity and an
increased risk of foreclosure.
To make matters worse, many of the adjustable-rate mortgages
have aged to the point that the two- or three-year "teaser" rates are
expiring and the new, higher interest rates are taking effect.
RealtyTrac estimates that 2.5 million adjustable-rate mortgages will
adjust to higher rates in 2008, perpetuating the mortgage crisis. 52
These higher rates significantly increase monthly mortgage payments,
threatening households already struggling to pay the lower rates.
Often, this leads to default, which in turn can lead to foreclosure and
repossession.
II. CLEVELAND'S ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY EXPOSES THE CITY TO
RAMPANT FORECLOSURES
The foreclosure crisis hit the city of Cleveland, Ohio, particularly
hard, and the suffering of Cleveland and its surrounding communities
is well documented. Nearly 30 percent of subprime mortgages in
Cuyahoga County "are either delinquent or in foreclosure."53 In 2007,
Cleveland had four of the top twenty-one ZIP codes for foreclosure
filings in the United States, including the highest ZIP code (the
community of Slavic Village), with 783 foreclosures.54 Reports
indicate that entire city blocks have been abandoned due to
foreclosures. 55 Overall, the city has suffered approximately 7,000
foreclosures a year for the last two years.56
While nearly every city in the United States has experienced the
negative effects of the housing bust, few cities were as vulnerable as
the city of Cleveland. With a shrinking population, a stagnant housing
market (even during the boom preceding the housing bust), and the
flight of many manufacturing jobs, Cleveland had numerous
economic problems even prior to the wave of foreclosures.57 The City
claims as much in its complaint, noting its "struggling, Rust-Belt
51 Les Christie, Home Prices in Steepest Quarterly Drop, CNNMoNEY.CoM, Feb. 14,
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/14/real estate/home_prices fall for-year/index.htm.
52 America's Property Crisis, supra note 49, at 31.
53 Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2007, at CI.
54 Les Christie, Foreclosure Focus: Where Cleveland Went Wrong, CNNMONEY.COM,
Nov. 14, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/12/realestate/Cleveland-foreclosurefactors
/index.htm [hereinafter Christie, Foreclosure Focus].
55 Maag, supra note 3.
56 Id
57 Christie, Foreclosure Focus, supra note 54.
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economy, the disappearance of the manufacturing sector.., and its
inability at the beginning of this decade to attract any meaningful
replacement." 58 When combined with high levels of poverty that
relegated much of the existing population to the rental market, these
factors made Cleveland an attractive market for subprime mortgage
lenders and brokers.
While these economic factors certainly contributed to Cleveland's
vulnerability, some attribute the high rate of foreclosures to poor state
regulation of mortgage lenders and brokers. 59 The state statute
regulating predatory lending and other unlawful lending practices,
Substitute House Bill Number 386, requires lenders to disclose terms
to borrowers and contains general protections against predatory
lending. 60 The House Bill also expressly preempted Ohio cities and
municipalities from passing ordinances that might further regulate
predatory lending.6'
But Cleveland, dissatisfied by what it saw as insufficient
protections against predatory lending in the state law, passed its own
anti-predatory lending ordinance. Unlike the state law, the Cleveland
ordinance placed lower thresholds on the interest rates lenders could
offer, lowered overall fees associated with mortgage lending, and
increased disclosure responsibilities.62 The ordinance received two
responses: 1) national financial institutions abandoned Cleveland as a
market; 63 and 2) the state legislature pursued litigation to eliminate
the ordinance. After months of litigation, the state legislature
succeeded in overturning the Cleveland ordinance, winning a ruling
before the Ohio Supreme Court that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate matters of general
and statewide concern.64
Safe from the higher restrictions, the mortgage lenders returned to
the city and the cycle of lending continued. As a result, Cleveland has
developed a new strategy to curb subprime lending: litigation.
58 Complaint, supra note 1, 50.
59 Christie, Foreclosure Focus, supra note 54.
60 H.R. 386, 124th Gen. Assem., 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. L-94 (West) (enacted)
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25-37 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008)).
61 Id.
62 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 824 N.E.2d 553, 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004),
rev'd, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
63 Christie, Foreclosure Focus, supra note 54.
6 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006).
2008] 1409
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
III. CITY OF CLEVELAND V. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY
A. The Complaint
On January 10, 2008, the City filed its lawsuit in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, naming twenty-one defendants in
the action.65 The complaint asserts that Cleveland, at the "epicenter of
a mortgage foreclosure crisis triggered by sub-prime lenders and the
monied interests that support them," has suffered significantly in both
increased expenditures on fire and police services and in a loss of tax
revenue. 66 Once a paragon of "neighborhood revitalization," the
complaint alleges that the sub-prime mortgage boom, bust, and
resultant foreclosures decimated the progress the city had made in
rebuilding its communities while encouraging home values upward.67
Instead, the plague of foreclosures left the city with blighted
neighborhoods, increased crime and fewer resources with which to
combat the increase.68
While the complaint alludes to the numerous proponents of
sub-prime lending, the City places liability for the damages to its
neighborhoods squarely on Wall Street investment banking firms (as
defendants, "Securitizers '' 69) that, as part of the secondary mortgage
market, created mortgaged-backed securities, developed a market for
these securities and generated more revenue that in turn perpetuated
the sub-prime mortgage market. 70  According to the City, the
Securitizers directly financed the sub-prime market, generating
substantial revenue for themselves and their investors.7
The City predicates its cause of action on Ohio common law
public nuisance. The City claims that the defendants proliferated
"toxic sub-prime mortgages" in Cleveland "under circumstances that
made the resulting spike in foreclosures a foreseeable and inevitable
result., 72 The crux of Cleveland's argument is that both the Lenders
65 Complaint, supra note 1.
- Id. 11,3.
67 Id. 2. However, the City is quick to note that Cleveland, unlike many other cities in
the United States, had never enjoyed a large upswing in housing prices. Id. 49. The City
suggests that Cleveland was both a rising star in city revitalization but also a weak housing
market. The City characterizes itself as a "struggling, Rust-Belt economy . . . [one of] the
poorest cities in the nation in 2003, when sub-prime money began 'seeking borrowers."' Id. TT
50-51.
68 Id. 77 1-3.
69 Examples of other Securitizers named in the complaint include Goldman Sachs Group,
Bear Steams, and J.P. Morgan Chase Co. Id. 7 15, 21, 25.
70 Id. 76-8.
71 Id.
72 Id. 64.
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(e.g., Countrywide Financial Corporation) and Securitizers (e.g.,
Goldman Sachs Group, Deutsche Bank Trust Company, Ameriquest
Mortgage Company, Bank of America Corporation) should have
known (and, indeed, did know) that the rampant increase in sub-prime
lending would eventually turn into an equally-widespread wave of
foreclosures, especially in vulnerable Cleveland.73 Securitizers "used
their preeminent status to set the standard that lenders applied to
determine who did (almost everyone) and did not (almost no one)
qualify for sub-prime financing. 74 The complaint alleges that
Securitizers did away with accepted, responsible underwriting
standards, instead preferring to "turn a blind eye when lenders and
brokers originated loans that made no economic sense., 75 These
loans, which came with such gimmicks as "teaser" rates, were
inappropriate for Cleveland-a city that never benefited from the
upsurge in housing prices. 76 According to the City, it was the
responsibility of Wall Street to "eliminate[] Cleveland as a market for
sub-prime lending," thereby denying Cleveland citizens of a popular
(if risky) means to secure housing.77 Instead of doing so, the
defendants preyed on Cleveland's "relatively high concentration of
lower-income families with below-average credit," especially
focusing on Cleveland's large "African-American population. 78
According to the City's complaint, between 2002 and 2007, the
foreclosure rate in Cleveland went from fewer than 120 to more than
7,500.7' But the City is quick to make clear that, separate from those
citizens exposed to the risk of foreclosure, the City has suffered its
own, unique damages as a result of the foreclosure crisis. Specifically,
the City argues that while it had "absolutely nothing to gain from the
sub-prime industry," the foreclosure crisis has devastated Cleveland,
necessitating "increased expenditure for fire and police protection, or
the cost of demolition., 80 Foreclosures have also injured Cleveland's
property-tax revenues, lowering the property value of both the
foreclosed home and those homes in the surrounding
neighborhoods.8' To wit, the City cites a recent study compiled by the
73 Id. 148-54.
74 Id. 42.
75 Id. 47.
76 Id. 7 48-49.
77 Id. 53.
78 Id. 54.
79 Id 56. The City further explains that, in 2007, approximately twenty Cleveland
homeowners per day faced the threat of foreclosure. Id. 57.
8 1d. 59.
81 Id. 60.
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Center for Responsible Lending which states that home values in
Cuyahoga County depreciated by more than $462 million.8"
Despite the widespread damage alleged in the complaint, the City
moderated its demand for damages, at least for the time being. In its
request for relief, the City asked for "compensatory damages of more
than $25,000 ... interest ... reasonable attorneys fees [sic] .. .and
any other relief that the Court deems just and equitable. 83 The full
amount of damages, the City explained, would be specifically
quantified at trial.84
B. The Removal
The form and substance of the City's lawsuit raises some obvious
questions. Although the complaint names twenty-one defendants, not
one defendant is either headquartered or has its principal place of
business in the state of Ohio. 85 Despite the role of Ohio-based
National City Bank as a leader in sub-prime lending in Ohio in
general and Cleveland in particular 86 -the same activities that
allegedly cost Cleveland millions of dollars-National City managed
to avoid being named in the complaint.87 In fact, the City's failure to
list any Ohio-based businesses in its complaint was a deliberate action
likely driven by several considerations.
By omitting Ohio-based corporations in its complaint, the City
eschewed the precarious position of placing liability on those
corporations for whom many of its citizens work and that already
pay taxes to Cleveland and the state. The City avoided alienating its
state-based businesses while still vindicating its rights against what
the complaint describes as the "Wall Street" parties.88 The City's
theory of the case is predicated on "Wall Street's" irresponsible
business practices, greed, and lack of concern for a struggling
Midwestern city.89  It would be incongruous (and frankly,
incompatible 9°) for the City to group Ohio institutions in with the
Wall Street lot.91
82 Id. 61
83 Id. 27.
SId.
85 See id 12-32.
86 See Teresa Dixon Murray, How National City's Mortgage Division Lost Haifa Billion
Dollars, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 12, 2008, at Al. National City Bank is one of
the nation's largest banks in terms of mortgages and deposits. See Andy Stone, National
City's Subprime Misery, FORBES.COM, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/markets/
2007/10/24/national-city-subprime-markets-equity-cx as1024markets35.html.
87 See Complaint, supra note 1, 12-32.
88 See id. 7.
89 See id. 77 48-54
90 By failing to include Ohio institutions heavily involved in sub-prime mortgage lending
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Additionally, by failing to include any Ohio-based businesses in its
complaint, the City exposed itself to removal to federal court. No
doubt desirous to escape the jurisdiction of the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, located in Cleveland, the Securitizers
removed to federal court.92 Conventional wisdom suggests that the
City would want to keep its lawsuit in the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas; arguably, this court would give preferential treatment
to the City's arguments and claims. But removal to federal court may
have been a concession that the City was willing to make to protect its
lawsuit. As discussed below in Part III.C.1, the City's complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for lack of standing. By removing the case to
federal court, the Securitizers assumed the burden of showing that the
City lacks standing: "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing" the elements of standing.93 Therefore, when
defendants remove cases to federal court, they invoke the district
court's jurisdiction and bear the burden of showing that the plaintiffs
lack standing.94 This burden shift could prove to be determinative if
(and when) the Securitizers move to dismiss the City's complaint.
C. Legal Issues Raised by the City's Complaint
As demonstrated above, the process of subprime mortgage lending
cannot easily be reduced to a commercial transaction between a
borrower and a lender. Rather, the process of lending is a chain of
events connecting the borrower, appraiser, broker, lender, securitizer,
and investor-any of whom might in a given transaction commit
fraud or other lending abuses. Yet the City identifies Securitizers as
the party most appropriate for its current litigation. Given the
in the complaint, the City arguably loses some credibility. The City has excluded those
businesses predominately operating in Cleveland and Ohio while advancing a cause of action
based on the actual or implied knowledge of the parties as to events occurring in Ohio. If any of
the sub-prime mortgage Securitizers and other lenders knew that Cleveland was ill-suited for
sub-prime lending, logic suggests that they would be those corporations operating within the
city limits.
91 Although National City avoided being named in the City's suit, it has its own problems
regarding the subprime market. A New York law firm is preparing a class-action lawsuit against
National City for allegedly failing to inform its shareholders about the risk of the subprime
mortgages it held on its books. See Matt Bums, N.Y Firm Mounts Class-Action Suit Against
National City, BUSINESS FIRST (Columbus), Jan. 30, 2008 at 1, available at
http://columbus.bizjoumals.com/columbus/stories/2008/01/28/daily l9.html.
92 See Notice of Removal, City of Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 571 F. Supp. 2d
807 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (No. 1:08 cv 0139), 2008 WL 199578.
93 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
94 See id.
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interrelated activities of numerous players in the mortgage game, the
City may not be able to show that the Securitizers caused its injuries.
The Securitizers can elect to raise this issue in one of two ways.
First, the Securitizers can argue that the City lacks standing to bring
its lawsuit because the City cannot demonstrate Article III standing-
specifically that its injuries are fairly traceable to the Securitizers'
actions.95 In addition, the Securitizers could contend that they are not
the proximate cause of the City's injuries, thereby precluding the
City's claims on the merits. The concepts of the fairly-traceable
element of standing and proximate causation are unique but
overlapping restrictions on a plaintiff's claims and therefore will be
discussed together below.
1. Standing Issues
The City's lawsuit first raises standing issues, mostly because the
City itself has not been a victim of predatory lending. The City has
not received subprime mortgages nor has it been defrauded by
brokers or lenders. Even so, the City can likely establish that it has
standing to sue the twenty-one defendants because the City is seeking
redress for its own unique injuries separate from those injuries
suffered by its citizens.
The Supreme Court has established a three-factor test to determine
96whether a party has standing to sue in federal court. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that, in order to satisfy
the minimal standing requirements, the plaintiff must plead a concrete
and particularized "injury in fact," caused by or fairly traceable to the
defendants (and not a third party not before the court) that may be
redressed by a favorable outcome.97
In addition to these constitutional requirements, a plaintiff may
lack standing due to several prudential considerations.98 One of these
considerations--particularly relevant to this case-is a third-party
standing limitation. Generally speaking, a plaintiff must vindicate its
own rights and not those of a third party.99 Therefore, if the City
attempts, either overtly or subtly, to stand in the shoes of its citizens
and pursue a suit against the defendants, the district court could find
that the proper plaintiffs are the citizens and dismiss the City's
95 See id. at 560-61.
96 As mentioned above, the burden rests on the defendants to show that the City lacks
standing, because the defendants removed the case to federal court.
97 504 U.S. at 560-61.
98 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975).
99 Id. at 499.
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complaint. l00 This prudential concern blends with the first prong of
the Lujan test (injury in fact) and therefore warrants consideration
alongside the injury discussion.
a. Injury in Fact
Here, the City avoids a potential standing issue by pleading unique
grievances and injuries separate from those injuries suffered by its
citizens. The City claims that the defendants caused it to expend
significant amounts for fire and police protection and also negatively
impacted the City's tax-income revenue. 0 1 Although these injuries
may have arisen from the same or similar conduct that injured
Cleveland citizens, the City's harms are uniquely its own. 10 2 The
increased municipal costs and lost revenue have already occurred and
indeed may continue to occur. 0 3 They directly affect the City and do
not depend on an injury suffered by the Cleveland citizenry.
Therefore, the City can establish the requisite injury without being
barred by the prudential consideration of third-party standing.
b. Redressability
Moving to the third Lujan prong, a favorable judgment in federal
court would compensate the City for its losses, thereby redressing the
alleged injury. Because the City can quantify its damages and can be
compensated for those damages by the defendants if they are found
liable, the City satisfies the third prong.
c. Fairly Traceable to the Defendants
The major problem with the City's complaint can be reduced to
proximate causation, which is part of the second prong of the Lujan
test. Assuming that the Securitizers did exactly what the pleadings say
they did and accepting the truth of the City's injuries (as required
100 For an interesting discussion of whether cities such as Cleveland could sue predatory
lenders and other defendants under a theory of parens patriae, see Entin & Yazback, supra note
15, at 762-67, 783 (concluding that it is highly unlikely that cities could succeed with parens
patriae claims).
101 Complaint, supra note 1, 59-60.
102 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 ("'[The injury in fact test] requires that the party seeking
review be himself among the injured."' (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1972)).
'0
3 See White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(holding that lost tax revenue and increased police costs are injuries in fact sufficient to satisfy
the minimal standing requirement); see also City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a city had standing to sue for damages to its own interests caused by the
development of a military base).
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under a motion to dismiss°4), those injuries may still not be traceable
to the Securitizers. Too many other parties-predatory brokers,
unethical borrowers, appraisers over-valuing houses, and negligent
lenders--contribute to the failure of mortgages and the resulting
foreclosures. 05 The City faces the near-impossible task of convincing
the court to ignore the myriad extenuating and intervening factors and
parties that together have created the subprime mortgage mess.10 6 The
City's myopic focus on the Securitizers belies the complexity of the
issues and ignores the links in the causal chain.
According to Supreme Court precedent, injuries suffered as the
result of a causal chain of actions by various parties become too
attenuated when based more on speculation than on actual facts or
data. 10 7 In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,10 8
the plaintiffs argued that the IRS had caused hospitals to deny
services to the homeless and indigent because the IRS had promised
favorable tax treatment if hospitals only provided emergency-room
services to these people. 10 9 The Supreme Court held that "[i]t is
purely speculative whether the denials of [non-emergency] service[s]
...fairly can be traced to [the IRS's] 'encouragement' or instead
result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
implications."" 10 Moreover, the Court found it purely speculative that
a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs would cause hospitals to provide
these services to the homeless."' The Supreme Court therefore
refused to permit the plaintiffs to proceed because "speculative
inferences" were necessary to connect the injury to the defendant's
actions. 1 12
104SeeLujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
105 Although more related to the issue of proximate cause, the Second Restatement of Torts
notes that causal connections are more restrictive where the tort is based on a defendant's
negligence (as it is here), than when there is a cognitive component to the tort. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 501 cmt. a (1965); see also City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257,
269 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he law has been willing to trace more distant
causation when there is a cognitive component to the defendant's fault than when the
defendant's conduct results from simple or heightened negligence.").
106 Some in the financial world would be quick to agree with the City's assessment.
Recently, Alan Greenspan blamed securitizers for the subprime mortgage failure. See Excerpts
of an Interview with Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2008, at D3.
07 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976).
108426 U.S. 26 (1976).
091d. at 28, 41-42.
I10Id. at 42-43.
1" 'Id. at 43-44.
121d. at 45.
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Such inferences are arguably as necessary here. First, the
foreclosures that created the City's alleged public nuisances could
have likely occurred had the defendants not securitized mortgages. As
in Simon, speculation is necessary to determine whether the
foreclosures resulted from the securitization of the mortgage or from
some other event, such as fraud by the borrower or some other
extenuating financial circumstance that caused the borrower to
default. Because securitization does not affect the terms or quality of
the mortgage, it becomes harder to suggest that subprime mortgages
foreclosed in Cleveland due to the securitization and not because of
some other action along the causal chain.
Additionally, subprime mortgages will continue to go into
foreclosure even if the City succeeds in its suit against the
Securitizers. While there may be less money to go around if
investment banks cease securitizing mortgages, mortgage lenders will
still make subprime mortgages that, as discussed above, have a
naturally-higher foreclosure rate than prime loans. And even without
the securitization of mortgages, foreclosures will continue-some due
to criminal activity by parties involved and others due to the natural
flux of the housing market.
The need for speculation demonstrates that the causal connection
could be too attenuated to satisfy the standing requirements. But the
district court may wish to get more information, either through
discovery or expert testimony regarding the role the Securitizers
played in the subprime market. Indeed, because standing presents a
threshold question involving constitutional and prudential limitations
on who may sue, regardless of the merits, the district court might
deny any motion to dismiss on standing.'
1 3
However, the proximate cause issue may be raised again after the
case progresses further, either at the motion to dismiss or the
summary judgment stage of the case. If, for example, discovery or
expert testimony reveals that foreclosures result primarily from the
activities of mortgage brokers or fraud by borrowers or appraisers,
then the court could be within its discretion to dismiss or render
judgment on the City's claims if the liability of the Securitizers is too
unforeseeable or attenuated." 4 Therefore, issues of proximate
causation and the attenuation of the City's claims are likely to be
reoccurring issues that the parties must address throughout the
proceedings.
113 See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 612 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Allen,
468 U.S. at 750-51).
11
4 See generally Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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2. Additional Legal Issues Raised by the Cause ofAction
Assuming that the City is able to overcome any constitutional and
prudential bars to its lawsuit, the City could still be vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. 1 5 The City
claims that the defendants created a public nuisance by funneling
money to mortgage lenders who encouraged mortgage brokers to
target borrowers whom the defendants knew or should have known
could not afford to take out home mortgages." 16 Once these mortgages
defaulted and the banks foreclosed the mortgages, Cleveland became
blighted with abandoned buildings and collapsing neighborhoods (the
public nuisance in question), thereby necessitating increased spending
on fire and safety protections. 17 Because there are so many links in
the causal chain connecting the nuisance alleged to the actions of the
defendants, the district court could likely find that the defendants did
not proximately cause the City's injuries.
a. Ohio's Broad Definition of Public Nuisance
Ohio law on public nuisance, which adopts the Restatement of
Torts definition, is incredibly broad. 18 Ohio defines public nuisance
as an "'unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public,"' which includes acts significantly interfering with public
health, safety, peace, or conduct that has produced a long-lasting
effect on a public right." 9 To be liable, the defendant must be aware
or should have been aware of the negative effect.' 20 This negligence
concept is incorporated into the definition of public nuisance. The
Ohio Supreme Court has held that an action for public nuisance is
often "'predicated upon carelessly or negligently allowing such
condition to exist.,,'
12 1
Two recent cases--one in Ohio state court and the other in federal
court-offer examples of the ability of Ohio's public nuisance laws to
accommodate sweeping claims by cities against corporations. First, in
White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio denied the defendant gun manufacturers'
motion to dismiss the City of Cleveland's lawsuit for public
115 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
116 See Complaint, supra note 1, 53-54.
17Jd. 63-65.
18 See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1965)).
19 Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(B) (1965)).
120 Id
121 Allen Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 595 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ohio 1992)
(quoting Rothfuss v. Hamilton Masonic Temple Co., 297 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ohio 1973)).
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nuisance. 122 In White, the City of Cleveland alleged that Smith &
Wesson and other gun manufacturers had created a public nuisance
by negligently designing handguns, thereby requiring Cleveland to
increase spending on police and other protection services. 123 The
negligent design also cost the city substantial tax revenue.1 24 In
denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court held that
Cleveland could use these damages to show the existence of a public
nuisance.
25
In a nearly-identical case to White, the Ohio Supreme Court in City
of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.126 held that the City of
Cincinnati stated claims for public nuisance for damages caused by
gun manufacturers. 27 Noting the unique role that gun manufacturers
played in the city's crime rate, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that
"[j]ust as the individuals who fire the guns are held accountable...,
[the defendants] can be held liable for creating the alleged
nuisance."'
128
Both White and Beretta demonstrate the expansive reading given
to Ohio's public nuisance laws. Any district court considering the
City's complaint against the Securitizers will likely give a similar
reading, especially under the deferential stance of a motion to
dismiss. When reviewing a complaint under the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard, federal courts will accept "all of the
factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff
undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that
would entitle him to relief.',129 Federal courts will presume that a
plaintiff's "'general allegations embrace those specific facts that are
necessary to support the claim."",130 Therefore, given the generous
standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the City's pleading that the Securitizers
proliferated subprime mortgages in Cleveland by funding the market
negligently, it is possible that the City's complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss.1
31
12297 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
1231d at 824. The similarities between the handgun litigation and the present mortgage
litigation are striking.
124 Id.
125 See id. at 829.
126768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
1271d. at 1150-51.
128Id. at 1143.
129 Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995).
130 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
131 See Complaint, supra note 1, 8. This assumes that the district court does not dismiss
the City's complaint for lack of standing as discussed supra Part II1.C. 1.
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b. The City's Complaint Imposes a Duty Where the Law Does Not
But the City's complaint is predicated on imposing a legal duty
where there is none. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, legal
activities cannot constitute public nuisances. "'What the law sanctions
cannot be held to be a public nuisance.' '1 32 Although no law
requires that investment firms exercise due diligence in packaging
mortgage-backed securities, 133 the City seeks to impose liability for
the failure to do so. The City finds liability because the Securitizers
packaged mortgages into securities without first "corroborat[ing] the
borrowers' wherewithal to pay."'
' 34
Essentially, the City's complaint is a claim of omission on the part
of the Securitizers; their failure to properly review the quality of loans
given by lenders caused the City's injuries. Yet Comment a of the
Second Restatement of Torts section on public nuisance notes that,
historically, the common law recognized that an omission could result
in a public nuisance only if there was a corresponding duty to perform
the act omitted. 135 Without a legal obligation to perform the due
diligence demanded in the complaint, the City cannot claim that the
Securitizers created a public nuisance for failing to take certain steps.
The City's complaint is predicated on the argument that the Wall
Street investment firms should have supervised the subprime
mortgage lenders. This means essentially that the City is faulting Wall
Street investment firms (private organizations) for failing to supervise
and regulate subprime mortgage lenders (other private organizations).
Therefore, although the definition of common law public nuisance in
Ohio is broad enough to encompass the alleged activities, the absence
of any duty imposed on the Securitizers could be the means by which
the defendants have the City's complaint dismissed. 136
132 Beretta, 768 N.E.2d at 1143 (quoting Mingo Junction v. Sheline, 196 N.E. 897 (Ohio
1935)).
133 Some commentators have suggested a scheme for forcing greater due diligence
requirements on investment banks. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007).
134 Complaint, supra note 1, 8.
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B cmt. a (1965).
136 This problem of imposing a duty on the Securitizers also raises an interesting state
constitutional question. As discussed in Part II, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down
Cleveland's ordinance imposing higher reporting and disclosure requirements on lenders to curb
predatory lending because a state statute forbade such ordinances. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City
of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 785 (Ohio 2006). Arguably, the City's lawsuit here is a gambit to
implicitly impose similar diligence requirements on investment banks securitizing mortgages.
Having its ordinance struck down, the City is now attempting to further regulate the mortgage
market by suing (and thereby changing the practices) of investment banks.
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CONCLUSION
While lawsuits against the financial elite may garner headlines and
promote stronger state laws against predatory lending, the city of
Cleveland can more effectively eliminate future instances of
predatory lending in three ways: 1) by providing legal assistance to
Cleveland's citizens to seek legal redress against wrong-doing lenders
and brokers; 2) to pursue criminal sanctions against those lenders and
brokers committing fraud; and 3) by resurrecting previously-rejected
attempts at regulating the mortgage industry. To precipitate such
changes, Cleveland may have to lobby the state government to take
active measures to support regulatory action.
Even the most successful lawsuit against the Wall Street elite will
not substantially affect the number of subprime mortgages offered in
Cleveland, because the market, through the bursting of the housing
bubble, has already diminished the amount of money lenders have for
such mortgages. Rather, the City should seek to discourage future acts
of fraud and other dishonest lending practices by actively prosecuting
criminal activities and empowering its citizens with both protective
regulations and effective legal remedies.
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